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Introduction 
The general election of 2006 was the closest 
fought contest since the party-system 
upheavals of the early 1990s. However, 
what was most striking about the outcome 
was less the sheer narrowness of the centre 
left’s victory (in terms of votes in the 
Chamber, in terms seats in the Senate) than 
the way in which the result so roundly 
confounded expectations. Narrow victories 
are possibly less unusual than is realised.1
Nor is it unheard of that the party that loses 
in terms of votes nevertheless wins in terms 
of seats.2 No, what was undoubtedly more 
depressing for centre-left supporters as, in 
the afternoon and evening of 10 April, they 
watched the results come in was the 
awareness that what had initially seemed 
like a certain victory (with exit polls amply 
confirming the poll results of previous 
weeks) was instead an outcome that would 
be uncertain until almost the last of the votes 
had been counted.  
The most likely explanations for the 
large divergence between the poll 
                                                
1 The Israeli Knesset contest of 1981 saw 
Menachem Begin’s Likud party beat Labour by 
just 10,405 votes or 0.5 percent of the total. The 
United States presidential contest in 2000 was 
decided by just 537 votes in the state of Florida. 
The German federal election in 2005 saw the 
CDU/CSU emerge ahead of the SPD by just 1 
per cent of the vote. 
2 If this is what happened in the case of the 2006 
Italian Senate contest, then the outcome was one 
to be placed alongside one US presidential 
outcome (that of 2000) and two British general 
election outcomes (those of 1951 and February 
1974) since the war. 
predictions and the votes actually cast will 
presumably be offered by polling experts in 
the coming days and weeks. Here we pursue 
somewhat more modest goals, offering some 
reflections on the causes of the outcome 
itself and on its significance for the general 
thrust of Italian politics. Our point of 
departure is the thought that the outcome of 
any parliamentary election anywhere can be 
conceived as the product of three 
interrelated sets of variables: the 
configuration of party and candidate line-ups 
among which voters are called upon to 
choose in the first place; the social, political 
and other factors impinging upon voters’ 
choices between these alternative 
configurations; the nature of the electoral 
system. The impact of the electoral system is 
both direct – in terms of the way in which it 
translates a given distribution of votes into a 
given distribution of parliamentary seats – 
and indirect – through its impact on 
perceptions of its likely effects and thus its 
impact on parties’ decisions about the line-
ups to offer, and on voters’ decisions about 
the choice to make between such line ups. 
With this is mind, the remainder of 
this paper is divided into four main sections. 
In the section following we offer some 
reflections on what it was, in the run-up to 
the election, that resulted in voters being 
presented with a choice that was essentially 
one between the parties of one or the other 
of two heterogeneous coalitions whose votes 
would be translated into seats by means of 
an electoral system that, against advice, I 
insist on calling a ‘mixed system’.3 The 
                                                
3 The reason for my insistence is that it seems to 
me that the system is mixed in the sense that it is 
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section after describes those features of the 
campaign that seem to us most relevant for 
an understanding of the election outcome. 
The subsequent section considers the 
outcome itself in terms of vote and seat 
distributions, the penultimate section the 
election aftermath. The final section 
concludes. 
The run-up       
One of the most striking – and, as we shall 
see, significant – features of the 2006 
outcome was the sharp decline in the support 
for ‘third forces’, unattached to either of the 
two coalitions. If in 2001 support for these 
forces (Lista Bonino, Italia dei Valori, 
Movimento Sociale – Fiamma Tricolore 
(MSFT), others) amounted to some 10 
percent, in 2006 it was less than 1 percent: 
see Table 1. The proximate cause was a 
decline in third-force candidacies in the first 
place, a development that was strongly 
encouraged by the electoral law with its 
higher thresholds for non-aligned than for 
aligned forces, and its provision that the 
votes of all parties – not just the votes of 
those eligible to receive seats – were to 
count in determining allocation of the 
majority premium. In the case of the centre 
left, however, it was a development that had 
begun much earlier, in the immediate 
aftermath of the previous general election. 
This was because in 2001 it was 
widely believed that the centre left had lost 
because it had been divided, and especially 
because it had failed to reach stand-down 
agreements with Di Pietro’s Italia dei Valori 
and, in the Senate election, with 
Rifondazione Comunista (RC). There must 
be at least a degree of uncertainty about this 
interpretation since it is based on rather 
strong assumptions about the summability of 
the votes of RC and Di Pietro on the one 
                                                                   
majoritarian and proportional in equal measure. 
With one and the same vote, the voter makes a 
choice both of coalition (where the coalition with 
most votes wins an automatic majority of seats) 
and of party (to which seats are allotted in 
proportion to its vote). 
hand and those of the rest of the centre left 
on the other. Nevertheless, the belief that 
these divisions had cost the centre left the 
election was sufficiently powerful to set in 
motion, in the years leading up to 2006, a 
coming together of forces that was 
somewhat paradoxical – paradoxical 
because if, on the one hand, the process 
represented a growing unity of intents, on 
the other hand each addition or merger only 
served to reduce cohesion by rendering the 
coalition ever larger and more 
heterogeneous. There were four stages to the 
process. 
 First, driven by the relative success 
of their joint list in 2001, the Margherita 
parties attempted merger in March 2002. 
However, if the Democrats had hoped that 
the new formation would be a first step 
towards the creation of a unitary political 
actor able to impose its sovereignty on the 
coalition, the Udeur refused to join at all and 
it soon became clear that the organisation 
was divided internally between those who 
saw themselves as secular, left-of-centre 
reformists committed to a bi-polar future for 
Italian party politics, and those who 
hankered after the idea of a party able to 
hold power by exploiting its location in the 
centre of the political spectrum, much as the 
Christian Democrats had done for so many 
years. 
Second, the emergence, in 2004, of 
the Federation – the agreement for closer 
cooperation between the Democratici di 
Sinistra (Left Democrats: DS), Margherita, 
Socialists (SDI) and the Repubblicani 
Europei that took shape after the European 
Parliament elections – induced Rifondazione 
Comunista to seek membership of the centre 
left coalition, probably as the consequence 
of a realisation that it faced a real risk of 
isolation and a loss of influence in the event 
that the Federation succeeded in drawing 
more radical forces, such as the Verdi 
(Greens) and the Partito dei Comunisti 
Italiani (Party of Italian Communists, PdCI) 
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Table 1  
Chamber of Deputies Election Results 2001 and 2006 
Proportional vote 2001 Vote 2006 
Parties and 
alliances 
Vote 
(%) 
Parties and alliances Vote (no.) Vote 
(%) 
Vote 
(%)* 
Seats 
(no.) 
  Unione     
Rif. Com. 5.0 Rif. Com. 2,229,604 5.8 5.6 41 
PdCI 1.7 PdCI 884,912 2.3 2.3 16 
DS 16.6 
Margherita 14.5 
L’Ulivo 11,928,362 31.2 30.4 220 
Girasole 2.2 Verdi 783,944 2.1 2.0 15 
Lista Bonino 2.2 La rosa nel pugno 991,049 2.6 2.5 18 
Italia dei Valori 3.9 Italia dei Valori 877,159 2.3 2.2 16 
  Udeur 534,553 1.4 1.4 10 
  Svp 182,703 0.5 0.5 4 
  Other Unione parties 590,533 1.5 1.5 0 
Total 19,002,8199.001.684 49.7 340 
Foreign constituency   
Unione 422,330 1.1 6 
Italia dei Valori 27,432  0.1 1 
Udeur 9,692  0.0  
Total 46.1 Total (National plus foreign const.) 19,462,273  49.6 347 
  Casa delle libertà     
CCD-CDU 3.2 UDC 2,582,233 6.8 6.6 39 
Forza Italia 29.5 Forza Italia 9,045,384 23.7 23.1 137 
National Alliance 12.0 National Alliance 4,706,654 12.3 12.0 71 
New PSI 1.0 DC-New PSI 285,744 0.7 0.7 4 
Northern League 3.9 Northern League 1,749,632 4.6 4.5 26 
MSFT 0.4 MSFT 231,743 0.6 0.6 0 
Other Cdl parties 380,914 1.0 1.0 0 
Total 18,982,304 49.7 277 
Foreign constituency   
Forza Italia 202,407 0.5 3 
  Per Italia nel mondo – Tremaglia 73,289  0.2 1 
  UDC 65,794  0.2  
  Lega Nord 20,227  0.1  
  Other Cdl parties 8,235  0.0  
Total 50.0 Total  (National plus foreign 
const.) 
19,352,256  48.5 281 
  Others     
  Autonomie Liberté Democratie 
(Valle d’Aosta) + 34,167 
0.1 0.1  
1 
  Vallée d’Aoste + 24,118 0.1 0.1  
  Forza Italia-AN (Valle d’Aosta) + 13,372 0.0 0.0 0 
Others 3.9 Others 173,263 0.5 0.4  
  Others (foreign const.) 146,008  0.4 1 
       
Total 100 National total 38,230,043 100.1 97.5 618 
  Foreign const. total 975,414  2.5 12 
  Overall total 39,205,457  100 630 
* The percentages in this column are based on the overall total of votes cast, i.e. including the foreign constituency 
+ These parties were linked to the two main coalitions: Autonomie Liberté Democrazie and Vallée d’Aoste were 
associated with the Unione, and Forza Italia-AN with the Cdl. They are listed separately because votes cast in the 
single-member Valle d’Aosta constituency are not included in the totals used to determine allocation of the majority 
premium. 
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Table 2 
Senate Election Results 2001 and 2006 
Vote 2001 Vote 2006 
Parties and 
alliances 
Vote 
(%) 
Parties and alliances Vote 
(number)        
Vote 
(%) 
Vote 
(%)* 
Seats 
(no.) 
  Unione     
Rif. Com. 5.0 Rif. Com. 2,518,624 7.2 7.1 27 
L’Ulivo 38.7 Insieme con l’Unione (PdCI 
and Verdi) 
1,423,226 4.1 4.0 11 
SVP-L’Ulivo 0.5 DS 5,977,313 17.2 16.7 62 
  Margherita 3,664,622 10.5 10.3 39 
Pannella-Bonino 2.0 La rosa nel pugno 851,875 2.4 2.4 0 
Italia dei Valori 3.4 Italia dei Valori 986,046 2.8 2.8 4 
  Udeur 476,938 1.4 1.3 3 
  L’Unione-SVP 198,153 0.6 0.6 3 
  SVP 117,500 0.3 0.3 2 
  Other Unione parties 927,640 2.7 2.6 3 
Total 17,141,937 49.2 154 
Foreign constituency   
Unione 387,145 1.1 4 
Italia dei Valori 26,134  0.1  
Udeur 13,265  0.0  
Total 49.6 Total (National plus foreign 
const.) 
17,568,481  49.3 158 
  Casa delle libertà     
Casa delle libertà 42.5 UDC 2,311,448 6.6 6.5 21 
  Forza Italia 8,201,688 23.6 23.0 78 
  National Alliance 4,234,693 12.2 11.9 41 
  Forza Italia-AN 11,505 0.0 0.0 0 
  DC-New PSI 190,724 0.5 0.5 0 
  Northern League 1,531,939 4.4 4.3 13 
Fiamma 
Tricolore 
1.0 MSFT 219,707 0.6 0.6 0 
Other Cdl parties 658,050 1.9 1.8 2 
Total 17,359,754 49.8 155 
Foreign constituency   
Forza Italia 185,438 0.5 1 
  Per Italia nel mondo – 
Tremaglia 
63,474  0.2  
  UDC 57,200  0.2  
  Lega Nord 18,455  0.1  
  Other Cdl parties 8,433  0.0  
Total 43.5 Total (National plus foreign 
const.) 
17,692,754  49.6 156 
  Others     
  Others 307,344 1.0 0.9 0 
Others 6.9 Others (foreign const.) 120,389  0.3 1 
       
  National Total 34,809,035 100 97.6 309 
  Foreign const. Total 879,933  2.5 6  
Total 100.0 Overall total 35,688,968  100.1 315 
Note: * The percentages in this column are based on the overall total of votes cast, i.e. including the foreign 
constituency
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into its orbit. The problem was that if for 
most of the rest of the centre left elections 
are above all about winning government 
power – so that policies are to be judged 
primarily in terms of the degree to which 
they make this possible – for RC elections 
are above all a means, but not the only 
means, of exerting political pressure to 
defend the poor and the vulnerable. 
Therefore, there are significant limits on the 
compromises RC is prepared to make for the 
sake of coalition unity. 
 Third, while the even more rapid 
decision of Italia dei Valori to seek alliance 
with the centre left was a decision that made 
‘ideological’ sense – its central mission 
being to combat illegality and less-than-
impartial application of the law, its natural 
home was in a coalition that questioned 
Berlusconi’s right to govern on similar 
grounds – the decision cannot have been 
unrelated to the ‘opportunist’ consideration 
that independence in 2001 had resulted in 
failure to elect a single deputy. And its 
presence was a potential source of disunity 
within the coalition if for no other reason 
than the fact that it was an additional party 
with its own goals and values: parties 
everywhere are entities for which alliance 
with other parties has instrumental but not 
intrinsic value – while unity and cohesion 
are public goods necessarily exposed to the 
collective action problem. 
 Finally, in November 2005, the 
formation of ‘la Rosa nel pugno’, bringing 
together the SDI and the Radicals, drew into 
the orbit of the Unione a party that had 
previously found it difficult to coalesce with 
either of the two main coalitions as its 
emphasis on individual responsibility – 
meaning a strongly libertarian stand on civil 
rights issues combined with firmly liberal 
positions in matters economic – gave it an 
uncertain location on the left-right spectrum. 
This was an ideological profile that had the 
potential to bring the new formation into 
conflict with the DS on economic issues, 
and the even greater potential to bring it into 
conflict with the Margherita on religion-
related issues. Secularisation notwithstand-
ing, the number and significance of such 
issues has grown, not diminished, in recent 
years as scientific progress has brought to 
the fore new problems on which the Church 
has wanted to take a position (Rémond, 
1999: 36). The proportion of regular Church 
goers among supporters of the Margherita is 
larger than among voters generally – 
meaning that it cannot afford to stray too far 
from conservative positions on issues on 
which the Rosa nel pugno takes 
diametrically opposed stances; for, as well 
as winning over new voters, it must retain 
the support of existing voters if it is to grow. 
Hence the potential for conflict between the 
two entities is significant. 
 Ideological heterogeneity on the 
centre left was mirrored to some degree on 
the centre right. True, three of the coalition’s 
four largest components – Forza Italia (FI), 
Alleanza Nazionale (AN) and the Northern 
League – have been reasonably united in 
representing different shades of the 
ideological profile to which Mastropaolo 
(2005) refers by using the label ‘new right’. 
This is an ideology that involves an 
attachment to social and cultural conformity, 
the conventional family, Christianity (as a 
cultural identity rather than a set of 
precepts), the nation (an invented one – 
‘Padania’ – in the case of the League), free 
markets and welfare chauvinism. The profile 
is an advantage to the coalition; for it 
provides the basis for a profitable ‘division 
of labour’ between the parties. With its most 
strident and crude expressions being 
delegated to the League and the other two 
offering more ‘respectable’ versions, all 
three parties are able to maintain reasonably 
distinct profiles. The problem is that at the 
same time, the ideology can bring the parties 
into conflict. In the case of the League, for 
instance, welfare chauvinism is also often 
directed against southerners, and that is, 
against precisely that part of the electorate in 
which AN, and also the Union of Christian 
Democrats and Center Democrats (UDC), 
find their strongholds. 
 However, the greatest difficulty for 
the centre right, in government after 2001, 
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was Berlusconi’s leadership. On the one 
hand, the extraordinary degree to which FI 
depends for its image, its finances and its 
organisation on its leader makes it difficult 
to imagine the party continuing to have a 
meaningful existence after Berlusconi leaves 
the political scene; and this has always 
reinforced the aspirations of AN and the 
UDC to capture leadership of the coalition 
for themselves given that they might, 
perhaps, expect to capture parts of the 
entrepreneur’s party in the process. On the 
other hand, while Berlusconi was in an 
extraordinarily powerful position 
immediately after the 2001 election (which 
he could claim had been won largely thanks 
to him) the sheer weight of campaign 
emphasis on his supposedly extraordinary 
personal qualities subsequently became a 
distinct liability – leaving few alternative 
means of retaining voter loyalty when 
economic difficulties began tarnishing the 
leader’s image. For these two reasons, 
Berlusconi’s capacity to impose discipline 
on his coalition declined as time went by – 
and especially after the 2004 European 
elections with their revelation that, if a 
government in difficulties was going to have 
to pay an electoral price, then it would be 
paid by FI rather than its allies and that they 
rather than the opposition parties would be 
the principal beneficiaries.4
 It was in this context that towards 
the end of 2005, the centre-right parties 
reached agreement on a new electoral law, 
which appeared to offer them at least three 
specific advantages. First, by allowing each 
of the parties to compete in relative 
independence, each with its own prime 
ministerial candidate, it considerably 
reduced the likely significance of 
Berlusconi’s personal popularity for the 
prospects of his allies and those of the 
coalition as a whole. As the 2005 regional 
                                                
4 FI’s vote declined from the 29.5 percent it had 
won in 2001 to 21.0 percent while both the UDC 
and the League saw their vote shares rise (to 5.0 
and 5.9 percent respectively). Meanwhile, the 
parties of the centre left made only modest gains 
to take 46.1 percent in 2004. 
elections appeared to confirm,5 had the 
parties been obliged – as they would have 
been had the 1993 electoral law remained in 
force – to line up behind single candidates 
representing the coalition as a whole, then 
they might have suffered badly; for in such a 
situation voters dissatisfied with Berlusconi 
and FI would have had no means of giving 
expression to their dissatisfaction other than 
by action (abstention or voting for the centre 
left) also damaging to the entrepreneur’s 
allies. Second, therefore, the new law held 
out the prospect of considerably reducing 
the leadership issue as a source of friction 
and instability within the centre right. Third, 
the results of the two previous general 
elections suggested that in the proportional 
arena the centre right’s constituent parties 
had a collective reach that extended beyond 
the pool of voters prepared to support their 
candidates in the plurality arena.6 This 
therefore provided an additional argument in 
favour of the new law.7  
                                                
5 The elections were a disaster for the Casa delle 
libertà insofar as the coalition: emerged the loser 
in 12 of the 14 regions where voting took place; 
took 12,220,858 votes (43.9 percent) to the 
centre left’s 14,632,412 (52.6 percent), and lost 
control of six of the eight regions it had won in 
2000. 
6 That is, in 1996, the centre right won 40.3 
percent of the vote in the plurality arena, but 42.1 
percent (not including the vote won by the 
Northern League) in the proportional arena – 
while in 2001, when it took 45.5 percent in the 
plurality arena and 49.7 percent in the 
proportional arena, the difference was even 
larger. 
7 Space does not permit going into the technical 
details of the new law, but in essence, for 
elections to the Chamber of Deputies, parties 
present lists of candidates in each of 26 multi-
member constituencies, voters being required to 
make a single choice among the lists with which 
they are presented. Parties can either field lists 
independently or as part of a coalition with other 
parties. Seats are distributed between the parties 
proportionally except that to be eligible to 
participate in such distribution, parties must 
obtain at least 4 percent of the national total of 
valid votes cast if they are running independently 
or as part of a coalition whose combined total 
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The campaign 
The centre right went into the campaign with 
a lacklustre record to defend and it was this 
above all that appeared to underpin 
confidence in predictions of a comfortable 
                                                                   
turns out to be less than ten per cent. If they are 
part of a coalition whose combined total is ten 
percent or more, then they must obtain at least 2 
percent of the national valid vote total. If an 
initial proportional distribution of seats results in 
the largest party or coalition receiving less than 
340 seats, then it is assigned as many seats as are 
necessary to bring it up to that figure, this so-
called premio di maggioranza (or majority 
premium) thus ensuring, for the party or coalition 
concerned, an overall majority in the 630 seat 
Chamber. The remaining seats are distributed 
proportionally among the other parties and 
coalitions. Given the fragmentation of the Italian 
party system, the effect of the law is, on the one 
hand, to encourage parties to field their lists as 
coalitions rather than independently while 
removing the pressure upon them to unite behind 
candidates representing the coalition as a whole; 
and on the other hand, to combine, for the voters, 
the choice of party and coalition into a single 
choice, while allowing them to support a 
coalition without having to cast a vote for a 
candidate drawn from a party other than their 
most preferred party. 
Arrangements for the Senate are 
essentially the same, but with the importance 
differences that: (1) seats are assigned to regions 
(in accordance with their populations) rather than 
to constituencies; (2) seat distribution (including 
assignment of the premio di maggioranza) takes 
place region by region (that is, seat assignment 
depends on parties’ and coalitions’ regional, not 
their national totals); (3) the premio in each 
region consists in the number of seats, awarded 
to the largest coalition or party, that is necessary 
to bring it up to 55 per cent of the seats assigned 
to the region; (4) in order to be eligible to 
participate in the distribution of seats, parties 
have to have attracted, if running independently 
or as part of a coalition whose combined regional 
vote total turns out to be less than 20 percent, at 
least eight percent of the valid votes cast in the 
region concerned. If it is running as part of a 
coalition whose combined vote is above 20 
percent, then it must have attracted at least three 
percent of the region’s valid vote total.  
centre-left victory; 8 for if Berlusconi had 
won in 2001 on the basis of his personal 
charisma and therefore of considerably 
heightened expectations of what he would 
be able to achieve, then economic stagnation 
and the consequent difficulties for the 
government in delivering on its promises 
(especially in the area of taxes) had created a 
level of public disillusionment and a degree 
of pessimism that appeared particularly deep 
seated: as polls constantly testified, the gap 
between expectations and reality fed 
perceptions of the state of the economy and 
standards of living that were sometimes 
much worse than official data suggested 
(Guarnieri and Newell, 2005). 
 Under these circumstances, the 
apparent decision of Berlusconi, from the 
start of the campaign, to do all he could to 
ensure that he remained at the centre of 
media attention and to ensure that the 
election acquired the significance of a 
referendum for or against himself might 
seem puzzling. In fact there is a very 
reasonable explanation for it. In the first 
place, the strategy was in one sense 
unavoidable given that FI is a party that 
lacks a clear ideological profile while having 
an image that is heavily bound up with the 
personality and qualities of its leader. This 
meant that in the face of evidence that the 
‘man of action’ capable of ‘getting things 
done’ had not got things done, Berlusconi 
was left with little alternative but simply to 
                                                
8 Since 1990, Italy’s economic performance has 
been well below that of earlier decades and 
nothing that the government did changed this. 
Between 2000 and 2005 the economy grew at an 
average rate of 1.1 percent and in 2005 the rate 
of growth was almost zero. Having taken office 
confidently predicting that it would reduce the 
debt-to-GDP ratio from 110.5 percent in 2000 to 
98.0 percent in 2004, in 2005 the government 
faced a level of public debt that still stood at 
106.5. In that year, with Italy’s budget deficit 
standing at 4.3 percent, the European 
Commission decided to recommend application 
of the Excessive Deficit Procedure, giving the 
government until 2007 to bring the percentage to 
below the 3 percent ceiling required by the 
Stability and Growth Pact. 
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deny the evidence, claiming that perceptions 
of economic stagnation were false 
impressions put about by ‘the usual’ 
commentators working for the left-wing 
press. Precisely this, however, enabled 
Berlusconi to turn a necessity into a distinct 
virtue; for, by insisting on the image of a 
leader hampered and unjustly attacked from 
all sides (from the left-wing press to 
communist inspired judges and occasionally 
his own allies), the entrepreneur was able to 
avoid fighting the campaign on his 
government’s record and to assume, instead, 
the appearance of an opposition leader 
whose dynamic qualities could still deliver 
much once freed, through reforms 
introduced in a second term, from the 
institutional and other shackles of his left-
wing tormentors. This in turn enabled him, 
in the final stages of the campaign, to 
wrong-foot the centre left. 
 Prior to that, the Unione had had 
good reasons to be optimistic. In the first 
place, the primary elections held on 16 
October – an experiment successfully 
repeated in Sicily in December and in Milan 
at the end of January – had done much to 
reduce the power of accusations that the 
centre left was necessarily unreliable 
because it lacked a leader with a party able 
to impose discipline on the coalition. By 
demonstrating the sheer weight of the 
popular support Prodi was able to mobilise 
the elections considerably raised his stature, 
and considerably strengthened, at least in the 
short term, the project for coalition unity 
that he represents. Second, the centre left 
had then gone on to publish a 281-page 
election manifesto which, while the object of 
some ridicule for its length, was presented as 
a coalition-wide agreement the very detail of 
which offered assurances that a centre-left 
government could remain united. Third, one 
or two slips notwithstanding, the parties of 
the Unione did manage to sing from the 
same hymn sheet most of the time. 
Particularly noticeable in this regard was the 
stance adopted by RC whose position 
furthest to the left on the political spectrum 
naturally fed expectations that the greatest 
challenges to coalition unity would come 
from this quarter. The unusual ‘moderation’ 
of the party’s public pronouncements almost 
certainly had to do with a conscious or 
unconscious decision to bow to the logic of 
centripetal competition in light of an 
awareness that, if the Unione were to win 
the elections, then the implications of the 
new electoral law were such that the party 
could expect to quadruple its parliamentary 
representation and to be indispensable to the 
maintenance of a centre-left majority. 
Finally, if the enforced resignation of two 
government ministers9 combined with the 
histrionic quality of the prime minister’s 
pronouncements to feed the impression of a 
government increasingly desperate and 
lacking in credibility, then this enabled the 
centre left the more effectively to convey the 
image of a coalition led by a man whose 
quiet competence offered the opportunity of 
‘a new start’ – ‘L’Italia riparte’ was one of 
the principal campaign slogans – after the 
economic ‘disasters’ of the previous five 
years. 
 Unfortunately for the centre left, the 
fiscal aspects of the new start it was 
proposing allowed centre-right spokes-
persons to push it into a corner and keep it 
on the defensive for the last ten days of the 
campaign – thus reinforcing the impression 
of a reversal of governing and opposition 
roles, with the centre left, not the centre 
right, being forced to account for its policy 
choices. The problem was essentially two-
fold. On the one hand, the centre left’s 
manifesto proposed the reintroduction of 
inheritance tax for ‘large estates’ – but 
without saying what ‘large estates’ were. 
                                                
9 In February, the Minister for Institutional 
Reform, the Northern League’s Roberto 
Calderoli, was forced to resign after appearing on 
television sporting a tee-shirt showing an anti-
Islamic cartoon, an incident that provoked 
violent protests outside the Italian consulate in 
Bengasi leaving eleven people dead. Less than a 
month later, in March, the Minister of Health, 
Francesco Storace, resigned, following 
suggestions that he may have been involved in 
spying and hacking activities designed to damage 
his opponents in the regional election the year 
before. 
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The almost inevitable consequence was that 
interpretations of what these amounted to 
differed as between the coalition’s 
spokespersons thus fuelling uncertainty 
about how far down the scale the tax might 
extend. On the other hand, the centre left 
proposed to harmonise the tax rates on 
financial activities by introducing a uniform 
rate of 20 percent, which would not, 
however, apply to state bonds already in 
circulation. Although this apparently left no 
room for ambiguity, the centre right was 
able to claim that since the Unione also 
wanted to reduce by five percent the gap 
between net salaries and employers’ labour 
costs (the so-called cuneo fiscale), the centre 
left would inevitably be obliged to attack the 
interests of small savers despite its 
protestations to the contrary. Finally, at the 
end of the concluding television debate, 
when nearness of the vote meant that his 
allies were in no position publicly to 
question policy improvisations, Berlusconi 
made sure that the high tax label thoroughly 
stuck to his opponents by suddenly 
announcing his intention of abolishing ICI 
(Imposta comunale sugli immobili), the local 
property tax, in the event that he was 
victorious. In the immediate aftermath of the 
vote, among the hypotheses advanced to 
account for the unexpected narrowness of 
the centre left’s victory, one of the most 
widely circulating was the suggestion that 
through the tax issue above all, Berlusconi 
was able, in the final days of the campaign, 
successfully to mobilise, in the centre right’s 
favour, voters that would otherwise have 
abstained (Augias, 2005; Diamanti, 2005). 
The vote   
From a purely descriptive point of view, the 
most salient features of the election outcome 
were the following. 
Turnout: This rose from 81.4 percent in 
2001 to 83.6 in 2006. Widely interpreted as 
an indicator of the way in which the 
bitterness of the competition had aroused an 
unusually high level of interest, the increase 
also appeared to give credence to claims 
made by the centre right that it would be 
favoured by an increased turnout. However, 
as the Istituto Cattaneo (2006) pointed out, 
in 2006 the electorate used to make the 
calculation did not include those entered in 
the Register of Italians Resident Abroad – 
who as a result of the passage of law no. 
459/2001 were for the first time given the 
option of voting in a new, overseas 
constituency. When the electors making up 
this constituency are built into the 
calculation the turnout falls to 81.8 percent 
(AGIPolitiche2006: 2006). 
Distribution of the vote between coalitions: 
In the case of the Chamber, the 20,515 
votes10 separating the Unione from the Casa 
delle libertà (Cdl) gave the former the 
majority premium and, with its deputies 
elected in the overseas constituency, a 
majority of 64. In the case of the Senate, the 
Unione was behind the Cdl by 217,817 votes 
and 1 seat in the national arena. When the 
overseas constituency was added, the 
Unione remained behind by 124,273 votes, 
but by taking four of the six overseas seats, 
it ended up with a majority of 2. There was 
very little change in the proportion of the 
vote won by each of the two coalitions as 
compared to 2001.11 The most noteworthy 
changes were, rather, ones that took place 
                                                
10 The final difference between the two 
coalitions, confirmed by the Court of Cassation, 
came to 24,755 votes. The difference between 
this, and our figure, is to be explained partly by 
the fact that ours does not take account of the 
votes cast for candidates in Valle d’Aosta 
(which, however, does not count for the purposes 
of award of the majority premium) or of the 
2,131 contested, and therefore initially 
unallocated, votes.  
11 In the case of the Chamber, for example, when 
to the centre-left’s earlier vote is added that of 
parties (RC, Lista Bonino, Italia dei Valori) that 
ran independently in 2001 but as part of the 
coalition in 2006, and when that total (46.1 
percent) is compared with the 2006 total (49.7 
per cent) the difference is only 3.6 percent. In the 
case of the Cdl, when from its earlier vote is 
subtracted that of the MSFT, which ran 
independently in 2001 but as part of the coalition 
in 2006, and when that total (49.6 percent) is 
compared with the 2006 total (49.7 percent) the 
difference is almost non-existent. 
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within each coalition in terms of changes in 
the 
distribution of the vote between parties. Of 
these changes, the ones that stand out most 
are the improved performance of RC, 
especially in the Senate, and the 
disappointing performance of the DS which, 
against expectations, won only 17.2 percent 
of the vote in the Senate contest. 
Comparisons were also made in the 
immediate aftermath between the combined 
performance of the DS and the Margherita in 
the Senate contest (27.7 percent) and the 
performance of their joint, Ulivo, list in the 
Chamber contest (31.2 percent) to draw the 
conclusion that the Ulivo had a capacity to 
attract votes that was greater than the sum of 
the capacities of its individual components. 
If true, then comparison with the combined 
performance of the DS and the Margherita in 
the 2001 Chamber contest (31.1 percent) 
suggests that the difference is easily 
overstated. On the centre right, the 5.8 
percent drop in support for FI combined 
with an improvement of a very similar 
amount (4.6 percent) in the support for 
Berlusconi’s three principal allies 
(especially the UDC) to suggest an image of 
disappointed FI supporters defecting to other 
centre-right parties. 
The geographical distribution of the vote in 
broad terms reflected established patterns 
and saw the Cdl prevail in the North, and the 
Unione in the central ‘Red Belt’ regions, 
with neither coalition clearly on top in the 
South and islands (Figures 1 and 2). What 
struck commentators most was the clear 
victory, against expectations, of the centre 
left in the overseas constituency,12 combined 
with its failure to hang on to regions it had 
captured from the Cdl in the regional 
elections a year earlier. Of these,13 Ligura, 
Abruzzo and Calabria returned comfortable 
Unione majorities in both chambers, while 
Puglia returned a comfortable Cdl majority 
                                                
12 The centre left had an approximate 10 percent 
vote lead in both the Chamber and the Senate. 
13 In April 2005, the Unione captured Piemonte, 
Liguria, Abruzzo, Lazio, Puglia and Calabria, 
previously governed by the centre right.  
(again, in both chambers). What must have 
been especially disappointing for centre-left 
leaders were the outcomes in Piemonte and 
Lazio where, in the Senate contest, the 
majority premium in each case went to a Cdl 
that was ahead by just 1.0 and 1.1 percent of 
the vote respectively.  
How are these data to be interpreted 
and what clues do they give us as to an 
explanation for the election outcome? Given 
what we said at the beginning of the paper 
about the three sets of variables in terms of 
which election outcomes can be understood, 
one is initially tempted, in the present case, 
to give particular emphasis to the specific 
configurations of party line-ups with which 
voters were presented in different parts of 
the country and to attribute a large role to 
‘chance’ factors. Specifically: much was 
made in the immediate aftermath of Progetto 
Nord-Est, a small non-aligned party whose 
92,000 votes would have been sufficient to 
deliver the majority premium to the Cdl in 
the Chamber. However, such reasoning also 
works the other way around: had Alternativa 
Sociale and Gianfranco Rotondi’s 
Democrazia Cristiana remained independent 
of the rest of the centre right in Piemonte 
and Lazio, as they had been at the 2005 
regional elections, then the Unione might 
just have repeated its wafer-thin victories in 
those regions – in which case it would have 
taken the majority premium in both cases 
and had the more comfortable majority of 14 
rather than 2 in the Senate. The problem 
with such intellectual games is that they are 
counterfactual – for example, in the absence 
of any additional information, it makes as 
much sense to deny the significance of the 
votes won by Progetto Nord-Est arguing that 
at least some of its supporters might have 
defected had it been aligned with the Cdl – 
and there is no limit to them: had the Cdl not 
included the MSFT, for example, its vote 
might have been smaller; but one might 
equally suggest that it would have been 
larger had the coalition decided to shun a 
party as extreme as the MSFT.  
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Figure 1  
Vote by Geographical Area, Chamber, 2006 
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Figure 2  
Vote by Geographical Area, Senate, 2006 
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Note:  ‘North west’ = Piemonte, Liguria, Lombardia 
 ‘White belt’ = Trentino Alto Adige, Veneto, Friuli Venezia Giulia 
 ‘Red belt’ = Emilia Romagna, Toscana, Marche, Umbria 
‘South and islands = Lazio, Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicilia, 
Sardegna.
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Unfortunately, we are not much 
better placed if, from the party line-ups we 
shift our attention to the second of the sets of 
variables in terms of which we said election 
outcomes could be understood, namely, the 
social, political and other factors impinging 
on voters’ choices. For example, among 
these factors one clearly has to include the 
effects of the parties’ campaigns. In the 
immediate aftermath much was therefore 
also made of the presumed shortcomings of 
the centre left’s campaign to explain why it 
had failed to achieve the decisive victory so 
many were expecting. It was said, for 
example, that while Berlusconi ‘imposed his 
frantic populism with the aim of dislodging 
every voter “disillusioned” by the absent 
miracle’, the centre-left’s campaign was 
‘now dull, now affected’; that while 
Berlusconi’s messages were ‘all inspired by 
individual wealth, houses, cars, mobile 
phones’,  Prodi ‘condemned the elimination 
of the primary surplus, an entity impossible 
to grasp’; that while Berlusconi ‘was highly 
effective in describing and promising private 
satisfactions’, Prodi responded ‘by appealing 
to competence, having recourse to the need 
to unite a country divided by five-years of 
centre-right government’ (Berselli, 2006: 
32-8). The problem with this is that it is pure 
conjecture: had Prodi achieved his 
convincing victory, then it would have been 
said that he had done so because while 
Berlusconi’s frantic populism failed to 
convince voters disillusioned by the absent 
miracle, Prodi’s campaign was sober and 
highly effective in appealing to governing 
competence. 
Unfortunately, until good survey 
data becomes available, answers to ‘why’ 
questions about the outcome cannot be much 
more than more or less well informed 
speculation based on the little evidence that 
is available. I offer the following 
interpretation. In the first place, we need to 
ask the right question. That is, the question 
should not be, ‘Why did the centre left fail 
to do as well as expected/the centre right do 
better than expected?’ as this assumes that 
the pre-election poll results, which appear to 
have been at variance with reality, can 
instead be taken as an accurate benchmark 
against which to measure performance, 
shifting the focus and burden of explanation 
away from the technical problems associated 
with polling to supposed anomalies in the 
objective behaviour of parties and/or voters. 
That there has long been reason to be 
doubtful of the polling evidence would have 
been clear prior to the election had observers 
reflected on the fact that the discrepancy 
between the coalitions’ poll ratings and their 
actual performance is not new but long-
standing. For example, with just one 
exception, the opinion poll reports on the 
site, ‘Il termometro politico’, at 
http://brunik.altervista.org/index.html put 
the centre left ahead by some five percent 
throughout the year 2004. The one exception 
was the report giving the actual results of the 
European Parliament election, where the 
distribution of the vote between the centre 
left and the centre right (46.1 percent to 45.4 
percent) was similar to and every bit as close 
as the result for the 2006 election.14  
No, the correct question is ‘Why did 
the centre left win?’, the correct benchmark 
its performances at previous general 
elections. These show that at the elections of 
1994, 1996 and 2001, the centre left trailed 
the centre right, in the latter case narrowly 
(see Table 3). This year, the centre left 
scored a narrow victory to take it from a 
position just behind the centre right in the 
Chamber plurality arena in 2001 (with 43.7 
percent to the centre right’s 45.5) to a 
position just ahead of it in 2006 (with 49.6 
percent to 48.5). In order to furnish an 
explanation, we need to know where the two 
                                                
14 It is for this reason (as well as the fact that 
opinion polls and exit polls told the same story) 
that, while I am reasonably persuaded by the 
hypothesis according to which some centre-right 
supporters are unable or unwilling to reveal their 
true sympathies (Natale, 2006), I am somewhat 
less persuaded by the hypothesis according to 
which the poll results were largely accurate and 
that there was a significant shift of support in 
favour of the centre right in the final stages of the 
campaign that was not publicly registered 
because of the ban on publishing poll findings 
after 24 March (Jampaglia, 2006). 
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coalitions’ votes came from. This 
information is provided by data drawn from 
the 2001 Itanes survey and a 2006 Swg 
survey and shown in Table 4. The picture 
that emerges from the figures is that the 
shifts that took place in 2006 were of an 
entity similar to the corresponding shifts that 
took place in 2001, but that they took place 
in the opposite direction: 
As in 2001, very few of those who 
had voted for one of the two coalitions at the 
earlier contest switched to the other and 
what switches there were, were largely self-
cancelling – but this time the net flow was 
from centre right to centre left. 
In 2001, the centre right was more 
successful than the centre left in winning the 
support of those who, at the previous contest 
had supported ‘third forces’ or been too 
young to vote – but this time the centre left 
was more successful than the centre right. 
In 2001, the centre right was more 
successful than the centre left in winning the 
support of those who had abstained at the 
earlier contest and it remained more 
successful, though to a lesser degree in 2006 
when, unlike in 2001, it also lost more of its 
previous supporters to abstention than did 
the centre left.   
I therefore think that the most 
plausible explanation for the election 
outcome is simply that voters were 
disillusioned with the promise of an 
economic miracle that never came and that 
they voted against Berlusconi as a 
consequence. The shifts were never going to 
be dramatic because, if by far the largest 
pool of voters at any election consists of 
supporters of one or the other of the two 
coalitions, then very few ever switch 
between them, and voters who want to 
‘punish’ Berlusconi appear to do so by 
switching to one of his allies: the 
information we have available is consistent 
with the suggestion that 2006 was quite in 
line with previous contests in this respect. It 
may be that Berlusconi was able to mount a 
partial come back as a result of the tax issue 
in the final stages of the campaign, but the 
information we have available does not 
throw any light on this. What the data does 
tell us is that besides being more successful 
at retaining its existing supporters, the centre 
left was more successful in the relatively 
small pool consisting of those who had 
failed to support either coalition or had been 
two young to vote on the previous occasion. 
Thus a modest victory is what one would 
expect. And the most parsimonious 
explanation for it is that after the experience 
of five years of centre right government, 
voters were on balance more convinced by 
the offering of the centre left. 
The attempts that have been made to 
dramatise the narrowness of the centre left’s 
victory stem essentially from its possible 
consequences – but the dramatic nature of 
the potential consequences should not be 
allowed to mask the reality of what actually 
happened. True, the centre left has a 
majority of just 2 in the Senate – but it might 
easily have had a majority of 14 (in which 
case no one would have got excited) and 
both the 1994-96 and the 1996-2001 
legislatures saw very small majorities in one 
or the other of the chambers. The image of a 
country ‘split down the middle’ must also be 
taken with a pinch of salt: the country is
split, but the two coalitions were closely 
matched well before 2006 when the salience 
of the division was heightened as the result 
of an electoral law that significantly reduced 
the vote for ‘third’ forces by pushing these 
to line up on one side or the other.  
The aftermath 
As W. I. Thomas (1923), famously 
remarked, ‘a situation defined as real is real 
in its consequences’, and in the immediate 
aftermath of the campaign the belief that the 
election had bequeathed a country divided 
into two provided the basis for a series of 
political skirmishes whose common 
denominator was a denial of the legitimacy 
of the centre-left’s victory. In the first place, 
it was immediately apparent that if 
Berlusconi had lost the contest numerically, 
then he had not been defeated politically. On 
the contrary: the fact that he had been 
expected to lose by a wide margin and had 
instead apparently staged a dramatic 
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Table 3 
Chamber of Deputies election results, 1994 – 2001 
Majoritarian arena 
 N votes % 
votes 
N votes % 
votes 
N votes % votes 
 Centre left Centre right Others 
1994 12,614,738 32.8 15,179,764 Polo 
2,561,546 AN 
39.4 
6.7
8,148,110 21.1 
1996 15,729,124 Ulivo
1,000,244 Prog. 
42.2 
2.7
15,028,275 Polo
4,038,511 League 
40.3 
10.8 
1,508,969 4.0 
2001 16,284,443 43.7 16,936,038 45.5 4,004,342 10.8
Proportional arena 
 Centre left Centre right Others 
1994 13,298,244 34.3 17,944,799 46.4 7,474,000 19.3 
1996 13,017,475 34.7 19,775,087 52.7 4,696,765 12.5
2001 12,976,189 35.0 18,433,911 49.7 5,673,061 15.3
Table 4 
Vote flows 1996 – 2001 (Chamber Plurality Arena) and 2001 – 2006 
Column percent Vote in 1996
Vote in 2001 
Centre 
right 
Centre 
left 
Other Abstention/ 
blank 
ballot 
Too 
young 
Centre right 84.7 9.0 40.4 29.3 34.2 
Centre left 4.9 80.7 17.3 15.3 27.6 
Other 1.5 1.4 28.8 1.3 4.8 
Abstention/blank 
ballot 
9.0 8.8 13.5 54.1 33.4 
  
Column percent Vote in 2001
Vote in 2006 
Centre 
right 
Centre 
left 
Other Abstention Too 
young 
Centre right 77.2 7.2 32.0 26.9 34.6 
Centre left 8.1 80.7 40.5 25.6 42.1 
Abstention 14.4 11.8 25.4 47.3 23.3 
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comeback to bring his coalition within  a 
handful of votes of victory meant that, 
despite the heavy loses suffered by FI, his 
position as leader of the centre right was 
strengthened. This gave the coalition the 
compactness required to enable Berlusconi 
and its other spokespersons to launch an all-
out attack on the new government-in-
waiting. In the first place it made a series of 
insinuations about presumed irregularities – 
eventually revealed to be without foundation 
– in the way the votes had been counted, 
suggesting that their correction would be 
sufficient to overturn the result in its favour. 
Second, and somewhat incongruously in 
view of the insinuation that victory belonged 
to it and not the centre left, it argued that the 
closeness of the result implied that a future 
government could not be legitimate unless it 
took the form of a grand coalition on the 
German model. If this was to obscure the 
obvious differences between the German 
and Italian cases (in the former, there was no 
single entity able to command a majority of 
seats, in the latter there was) it served the 
political purpose of keeping the centre left 
under pressure and presaged a future in 
which the new government could expect its 
measures to be constantly denounced as 
illegitimate on the grounds that it itself had 
the backing of only half the country. The 
approach was one that was in keeping with 
the anti-political attitudes – emphasising the 
importance of ‘the people’ and intolerant of 
established political conventions and of 
institutional limitations on the use of power 
– that many on the centre right, and 
especially Berlusconi himself, represent. 
Under this kind of pressure, two alternative 
responses on the part of a future centre-left 
government could be envisaged: either it 
would succumb to opposition attempts to 
exploit the divisions in its ranks and 
therefore fail to last for any length of time, 
or it might find that the very precariousness 
of its position was, paradoxically, its 
strength, giving it a degree of cohesion it 
might otherwise not have had. At the time of 
writing (the week following the election) it 
is not possible to know which of these two 
scenarios, or something in between, will be 
closest to the truth, early indications 
pointing in both directions.  
On the one hand, it looked as though 
the prospects for the talked-about merger of 
the DS and the Margherita in a Partito 
Democratico – the successor to the 
Federation project, which Prodi considered 
essential to cohesive government – had been 
improved by the election outcome. The 
reason is that the ‘added value’ of the two 
parties’ joint, Ulivo, list argued in favour of 
the view that it had been essential to the 
coalition’s victory in the Chamber, and 
suggested that it was essential to balance the 
coalition’s ‘extremes’: in the Chamber 
contest, so the reasoning went, some of RC’s 
voters had been prepared to reinforce Prodi 
and the entire coalition by voting for the 
Ulivo; in the Senate contest, where the Ulivo 
symbol had not been present, they had voted 
for their own party (which had done 
exceptionally well). Second, it looked as if 
many if not all of the leaders of the 
coalition’s parties would join the new 
government or assume positions close to 
government (as in the case of the presidency 
of the Chamber of Deputies for which 
Fausto Bertinotti was being widely tipped). 
In this it looked as though Prodi was 
imitating Berlusconi five years earlier in a 
move that was unusual for post-war Italy but 
that could be expected to increase the 
stability of the administration (Newell and 
Partridge, 2002). That is, by including the 
party leaders in his cabinet, Prodi would 
bind the prospects of any one of the parties 
individually closely to the success or 
otherwise of the government as a whole, in 
the process strengthening his own hand vis-
à-vis the parties and that of the executive 
vis-à-vis Parliament. 
 On the other hand, there were also 
signs that the Partito Democratico might 
have considerable difficulties in taking off. 
If a first step towards its creation had by 
common consent always been recognised to 
lie in the creation of unified groups in the 
two chambers after the election, then for 
supporters of the project, the voices that 
began suggesting that Parliament’s standing 
orders would delay their formation had to be 
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considered worrying.15 Similarly worrying 
had to be considered the suggestions of 
some within the DS that the project should 
be delayed on the grounds that far from 
balancing the ‘extreme left’ the project 
would increase its vote (De Marchis, 2006a: 
10). And its chances of success have to be 
considered much less than even in any event 
simply because of the fundamental 
ideological incompatibilities of the two 
parties involved (the one having roots in the 
communist tradition, the other in 
Catholicism) and because of the potential 
losers from the project in both parties 
(Dilmore, 2005; Newell, 2006). Second, the 
new government will take office at a time of 
considerable economic difficulties, the 
pressures to reduce the budget deficit and 
the level of public debt bequeathed by its 
predecessors leaving it very little room for 
popular public spending measures. Some 
were therefore prepared to argue that the 
most likely scenario was that of a 
government diligently delivering austerity 
measures and thereby paving the way for 
defeat at the next election by a right-wing 
coalition once again enjoying all the 
conditions necessary to allow it to raise 
levels of public spending and reduce taxes 
(D’Eramo, 2006). Under pressure to accept 
labour-market and welfare reforms, 
supposedly essential to the recovery of 
international competitiveness, the position of 
RC is likely to be particularly 
uncomfortable, entrapped as it is between a 
government whose survival depends on it, 
and the aspirations of its working-class 
supporters. The party was already coming 
under heavy pressure from its allies, few of 
whom appear to have much interest in the 
egalitarian causes it seeks to defend, as soon 
as the election result was known.  
  
                                                
15 In essence, it was suggested that a unified 
group would risk the loss of the coalition’s 
majority in the Senate’s commissions and a 
reduction in funding of €32,000 per month (De 
Marchis, 2006: 7). 
Conclusion 
The 2006 election was a classic case of the 
‘social construction of reality’ in the sense 
that the meanings political actors ascribed to 
the parties’ and voters’ behaviour – and 
therefore the very real consequences of the 
election outcome – owed less to what parties 
and voters actually did than to 
preconceptions of what they were expected
to do. Quite unrealistically on the basis of 
previous trends, Prodi was expected to 
defeat Berlusconi by a large margin, so that 
when, sure enough, the margin instead 
turned out to be modest, it was the centre 
left that was deemed to have failed, 
Berlusconi the one deemed to have been the 
political, if not numerical, victor – with the 
consequence that the entrepreneur’s position 
has been objectively strengthened beyond 
what would otherwise have been the case. 
The idea that the centre left lost votes 
because it ran an ineffective campaign is 
sheer conjecture, yet one whose repetition 
must objectively weaken it in the election’s 
aftermath. But the most exquisite example of 
the social construction of reality comes with 
the image of a country ‘split down the 
middle’. Little more than the 
straightforward, and to-be-expected 
consequence of an electoral law that creates 
very strong disincentives for ‘third force’ 
candidates, it is nevertheless an enormously 
powerful image. In a bipolar system it is 
hardly reasonable to expect voters to be split 
other than in two ways. Nor is it reasonable 
to suggest that a country that divides its 
votes in the proportions 50.1 to 49.9 is any 
more split than a country that divides 48 to 
52, say (D’Eramo, 2006). The problem is 
that the belief is likely to have real 
consequences and to be particularly 
insidious for the new government. The 2006 
election offers a very good example in 
support of the point that political scientists, 
pollsters and other observers are part of the 
world they seek to study, so that the idea 
that they can adopt a position of value 
neutrality and study it in a way that is 
without political consequences is simply 
false. ‘Neutrality’ is itself a political 
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position, theory construction itself a political 
activity. It does not seem unreasonable to 
suggest that the prospects for the new 
government will be enhanced if this point is 
taken to heart. 
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